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Abstract
Simple exchange experiments have revealed that participants trade their endow-
ment less frequently than standard demand theory would predict. List (2003a) finds
that the most experienced dealers acting in a well-functioning market are not subject
to this exchange asymmetry, suggesting that a significant amount of market experi-
ence is required to overcome it. In order to understand this market-experience effect,
we introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty, choice uncertainty and
trade uncertainty, both of which could lead to exchange asymmetry. We conjecture
that trade uncertainty is most important for exchange asymmetry. To test this conjec-
ture, we design an experiment where the two treatments impact differently on trade
uncertainty, while controlling for choice uncertainty. Supporting our conjecture, we
find that “forcing” subjects to give away their endowment in a series of exchanges
eliminates exchange asymmetry in a subsequent test. We discuss why markets might
not provide sufficient incentives for learning to overcome exchange asymmetry.
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1 Introduction
Simple exchange experiments, starting with Knetsch (1989), have shown that participants
trade their endowments less frequently than standard demand theory would predict. This
could suggest that individuals value objects differently according to whether they possess
them or not. Taken at face value, this exchange asymmetry or “endowment effect”1 implies
that subjects may well miss out on beneficial trades. To evaluate the impact of such anom-
alies in actual markets, it is important to understand whether this exchange asymmetry
disappears with market experience.2 List (2003a) ran an experiment where the subjects
were dealers acting in a well-functioning market. He shows that the most experienced deal-
ers are indeed not subject to any exchange asymmetry. List’s experiment has played a
prominent part in the debate about the robustness of laboratory results in the field.
This raises the question of what it is that the market actually does that makes people
rational. The answer is generally twofold: the market selects rational individuals – the
market acts as a filter for irrational behavior – and provides incentives to correct any
mistakes – the market acts as a teacher (see List and Millimet, 2008, and the numerous
references therein). Selection by markets is easy to understand. Those who make too many
mistakes perform poorly on the market and either choose to withdraw or go bankrupt.
But little is known about how market experience succeeds in teaching participants to avoid
1We agree with Plott and Zeiler (2007) that the term “endowment effect” is problematic, as it already
entails an interpretation of the phenomenon observed, namely that too little trade in simple exchange
experiments is driven by the fact that players are endowed with one of the goods and experience loss aversion
with respect to their endowment. We follow Plott and Zeiler in using the term “exchange asymmetry”.
2A natural question is how individuals can lack market experience since most of us are active in the
market nearly every day. This is certainly true with respect to buying. However, most individuals, including
typical laboratory subjects, have little experience as sellers. As pointed out by Kahneman et al. (1990)
among others, the pathologies in question are most likely to occur on the selling side of the market.
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anomalies, such as exchange asymmetry. We make the following four observations should
be taken into account to understand this learning process.
First, in List’s (2003a) experiments, only traders with intense market experience over-
come exchange asymmetry. Specifically, the experienced traders for whom no significant
exchange asymmetry is detected are those with six or more trades a month, and they have
typically had this experience for several years. Thus, learning seems to be fairly slow.
Second, List (2003a) also reports experiments in which subjects take part in four trading
sessions, each separated by a week. He notes a decline in, although not the complete
elimination of, exchange asymmetry, concluding that these results “reinforce the notion
that useful cognitive capital builds up slowly, over days or years, rather than in the short
run of an experiment” (p. 67), as noted previously by Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
Third, the experiments which test for exchange asymmetry are very simple and do not
require any computational skills, nor inferences about others’ behavior. Subjects are simply
asked whether they want to exchange their object for another one. It is thus surprising
that a great deal of experience is required to perform such a simple task adequately.
Finally, while List (2003a) uses unique sports collectors’ items, List (2004) replicates a
classic experiment in which choices involve mugs and chocolate bars, again using partici-
pants who have experience in a sports-card market. As in List (2003a) only the participants
with very intensive market experience in the sports-card market, here twelve or more trades
a month, exhibit no exchange asymmetry in the simple choice experiment with mugs and
chocolate bars. These results also suggest that trading behavior learned in one market can
be carried over to other markets in substantially different goods.
Taken together, these four observations imply that the market is not easily able to
eliminate exchange asymmetry and that learning is slow. Alternatively, it could be the case
that no learning occurs at all, but that there is selection (those who are not subject to
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exchange asymmetry simply trade more both in the market and in the laboratory). Given
the slow speed at which participants overcome exchange asymmetry (if they learn at all),
we may well wonder whether the market is a poor teacher of this subject3 or rather whether
the lessons to be learned to overcome exchange asymmetry are simply very difficult.
One plausible hypothesis is that market experience helps to overcome exchange asym-
metry by reducing the uncertainty that participants face. On the one hand, experience with
trading certain types of goods should reduce traders’ uncertainty about their preferences
regarding these goods. On the other hand, the learning spillovers mentioned in the final
point above suggest that market experience may also reduce the perceived uncertainty in
the trading process. Note that in typical exchange experiments, the objects are carefully
chosen to have roughly equal market value. Any small amount of uncertainty may then
affect subjects’ behavior, even if it appears to be negligible in other experiments. Over-
all, there are many types of uncertainty that subjects may perceive in the face of a trade
opportunity, but we argue that these fall into one of the following two distinct categories:
choice uncertainty or trade uncertainty.
Choice uncertainty covers all of the potential sources of uncertainty that matter when an
individual has to choose between two or more objects. The relative value of the objects at
stake could be uncertain, individuals may have incomplete or fuzzy preferences, and so on.
Choice uncertainty thus subsumes what we might call object or product uncertainty as well
as preference uncertainty. This only addresses uncertainty about which of the consumption
bundles is preferred, but does not include phenomena such as loss aversion.
Trade uncertainty concerns market procedures. Individuals sometimes overestimate the
cost or risk associated with market transactions. They may thus be reluctant to trade
3We stress that learning in the marketplace regarding other issues may be much faster. For example,
market participants may learn quickly how prices are formed on markets.
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if the benefits of doing so are too small, judging that these benefits will not cover the
transaction costs (including any risks from trade). In general, trade uncertainty concerns
any uncertainty regarding the trading procedure itself. At the most basic level, trading,
in contrast to choosing, involves a (human) partner. This implies that issues like other-
regarding preferences might come into play. For example, as Plott and Zeiler (2007) argue,
the typical designs found in exchange experiments entail the potential risk of offending
the experimenter by rejecting an initial endowment perceived as a gift. Anything that
could be interpreted as uncertainty regarding transaction cost falls into the category of
trade uncertainty. If individuals are biased against trading because of such risks or due
to a general dislike of controversy or bargaining, or even thinking and deciding, they will
exhibit exchange asymmetry that may suggest that they are loss-averse.
This distinction4 helps us to make sense of the four observations listed above. If subjects
perceive trade uncertainty, then in order to realize that trading is not as risky as they feared,
they need to experience trade in precisely those situations where they were reluctant to
trade. If they are free to choose when to trade, however, they will only very rarely make
such trades, for example only if the good to be obtained holds the promise of a substantial
gain. The market would thus be a poor teacher because traders will avoid those trades that
would teach them the crucial lessons. Hence, if trade uncertainty is largely responsible for
exchange asymmetry, this is consistent with learning to overcome it being slow, if it occurs
at all. On the other hand, if people learn new trading strategies, they can also apply these
4A similar distinction between what we interpret as trade and choice uncertainty has been suggested
by, e.g., Plott and Zeiler (2007) and Braga and Starmer (2005), who distinguish between “institutional
learning” and “value learning”. This distinction parallels to a certain extent our own between trade and
choice uncertainty, but Braga and Starmer’s institutional learning is more related to subjects’ understanding
of the technical functioning of the mechanism (similar to Plott and Zeiler, 2005), whereas trade uncertainty
captures the (social) risk associated with the mechanism.
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to different types of goods, so that the spillover effects observed in List (2004) are plausible,
whereas they cannot be explained by a reduction in choice uncertainty. Furthermore, trade
uncertainty makes it plausible that exchange asymmetries appear for everyday consumable
goods as those used in List (2004), which are unlikely to cause any choice uncertainty.
In order to test our hypothesis that trade uncertainty is a major factor in explaining
exchange asymmetry, we design an experiment that (1) controls for choice uncertainty and
(2) impacts on trade uncertainty by providing incentives to consider new trading strategies.
Our design incorporates two distinct stages. The first consists of a simple (experimental)
market in which subjects can trade with each other without any restrictions on how they
interact, bargain, move, and so on. After this training stage, we test for the existence of
exchange asymmetry in the second stage, which is carried out in isolation where subjects
can only trade with the experimenter. The second stage is identical in all of our treatments.
Our two treatments only differ in one aspect. In one treatment subjects are free to
trade at the market stage, while in the other they are forced to trade, i.e. if they do not
exchange their initial endowment, they lose it. This “forced” trade encourages participants
to trade even in situations where they perceive considerable trade uncertainty and would
hence normally avoid trade. As a result, relatively little experience can be sufficient to
learn new trading strategies.
We find that when forced to overcome their reluctance to trade during the market stage,
subjects no longer subsequently exhibit exchange asymmetry. In contrast, when trade in the
market stage is voluntary, we detect clear exchange asymmetry in the second stage. These
results support the hypothesis that the exchange asymmetry in our experiment is largely
driven by trade uncertainty and probably to a greater extent than by choice uncertainty.
In Section 2 we explain our experimental design and procedures in detail. This is
followed by the results in Section 3 and a discussion in Section 4.
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2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our first experiment was run in April 2007 at the University of Antille-Guyane in Martinique
with a total of 74 subjects. A replication, with a much larger number of subjects, 246, was
run in September and October 2009 in Paris. Our subjects are Economics students in
the first experiment and students in various disciplines in the second. Participants were
exogenously sorted into the different treatments.
The laboratory consisted of a circle of 20 small tables. On entering the room, partic-
ipants drew cards assigning them to one of these tables. There were two stages in the
experiment. The first consisted of three interactive trading rounds that provided subjects
with the opportunity of gaining trading experience. The second stage was performed in
isolation and is a standard test of exchange asymmetry.
In each trading round, the participants were randomly endowed with one of two different
goods. After being given the opportunity to freely inspect the goods, they were assigned
one of the goods by drawing a card that was then exchanged for the respective good. All
the goods had non-trivial value for the participants: a package of coffee and a package of
rice (round 1), a packet of crisps and a can of cola (round 2), and a note-pad and a ball-pen
(round 3). In Experiment 2, the objects were the same, except in round 1 where the rice
was replaced by a set of toothbrushes.
The first stage of the experiment, i.e. the trading rounds, consisted of either “free trade”
or “forced trade” rounds of exchange. Interaction, movement and communication were not
restricted in any way and participants could see all of the other participants in the session
at any time. In the free-trade sessions, participants were free to trade with any of the
participants who was endowed with the other good. Participants could keep the good they
possessed at the end of each round, whether it be that with which they were endowed at
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the beginning of the round or the other. The duration of each trading round was restricted
to a total of 5 minutes.
The forced-trade sessions differed from the free-trade sessions in only one respect. Par-
ticipants were only allowed to keep the good they possessed at the end of the round if
it was not the type of good with which they were originally endowed. If they were still
in possession of their endowment good, they had to return it to the experimenter. They
were thus “forced” to trade, in the sense that they had to trade with a participant who
was endowed with a different good in order not to forfeit their goods. This procedure was
aimed as a shock-therapy for participants who are generally reluctant to trade.
In all sessions, we gradually introduced an imbalance in the endowments over the three
rounds. In the first round, the two goods at stake were given out in equal numbers. So
exactly half of the participants received one good and the other half received the other
good. In the second round, there were two more items of one of the goods than of the other
good, and four more in the third. This increases the number of players who are unable to
trade. The aim here was to create pressure on the participants with the good in excess
supply to trade fast, in particular in the forced-trade sessions.
After the third trading round, participants were given an additional good as compensa-
tion while filling out a survey. In any one session all participants were given the same good.
They were informed that they could do whatever they wanted with this good. They were
then asked one by one to proceed to an adjacent room with their goods (the ones they kept
from the trading rounds and their additional endowed good). Once in isolation, a short
exit interview was conducted (which, as expected for such a simple experiment, did not
reveal any particular misconceptions by subjects regarding the experimental procedures).
The experimenter then offered the opportunity to exchange their additional endowed good
8
Endowment DVD Endowment Paper Total
Free Trade free-D (18) free-P (20) 38
Experiment 1
Forced Trade forced-D (16) forced-P (20) 36
Total 34 40
Endowment Choc Endowment Mug Total
Free Trade free-C (60; 3) free-M (76; 4) 136
Experiment 2
Forced Trade forced-C (56; 3) forced-M (54; 3) 110
Total 116 130
Table 1: Summary of the experimental treatments. Endowment is the type of good given as
compensation for participation after the end of the first stage. The number of participants in each
treatment is given in parentheses. For Experiment 2 the number of independent observations is
also given in parentheses. Totals refer to the total numbers across categories.
for another one. This stage was identical in both the forced-trade and the free-trade ses-
sions. The extent of trade at this last stage then serves to test for any exchange asymmetry.
The procedure in this stage closely follows that in List (2003a) so as to make our results
comparable.
Plott and Zeiler (2007) have demonstrated that exchange asymmetries can be influenced
by experimental procedures. In order to control for any aspects that might influence the
results, we applied exactly the same procedure in each session.5
We hence have a 2x2 design, with one dimension being the type of market experience
(free vs. forced) in the first stage of the experiment and the other the type of good with
which subjects were endowed in the second stage. In Experiment 1, the second stage
involves either a re-writable DVD (D) or a package of copy paper (P). In Experiment 2, we
returned to the classic mugs and chocolates. Pre-tests with other students revealed that
all of these goods were of non-negligible value for participants. Table 1 summarizes the
5Specifically, in all sessions, the object received at the end of the trading rounds was put in front of the
subjects. It was made clear to them that the object was theirs and that they were free to use it as they
wanted, with the precise wording fixed in advance.
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Treatment Endowment Leaves with A Leaves with B Trade Rate
A (Paper) 15 5 25%
Free Trade B (DVD) 7 11 38.9%
Average 31.9%
Experiment 1
A (Paper) 9 11 55%
Forced Trade B (DVD) 6 10 37.5%
Average 46.3%
A (Chocolate) 47 13 21.7%
Free Trade B (Mug) 38 38 50%
Average 35.9%
Experiment 2
A (Chocolate) 38 18 32.1%
Forced Trade B (Mug) 39 15 72.2%
Average 52.2%
Table 2: Goods subjects leave with conditional on goods endowed with in the free-trade and
forced-trade treatments. In the absence of exchange asymmetry the good the subjects leave with
would have to be independent of their endowment.
treatments. The number of participants in each treatment is shown in parentheses. We
carried out four independent sessions in Experiment 1 and 13 in Experiment 2, with 16 to
20 participants in each session.
3 Experimental Results
In the absence of any exchange asymmetry, the average trade rate across endowments in
the final stage should be close to 50%. Exchange asymmetry implies a smaller average rate
of trade. If, as we hypothesize, trade uncertainty is largely responsible for exchange asym-
metry, the latter should be substantially reduced after forced trade. It is also reasonable
to expect that the participants in the free-trade sessions who trade more frequently would
exhibit less exchange asymmetry than participants who trade less frequently. This would,
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however, not allow us to infer that the former participants learn to trade, as this could just
reflect a selection effect with those who are generally more willing to trade trading more,
both in the three rounds of free trade and in the second stage of the experiment.
We find clear support for our main hypotheses. Table 2 shows the relationship between
the initial endowment and the good the subjects leave with and the trade rates. The average
trade rate is substantially below the rational level in the free-trade treatments.6 There is
thus considerable exchange asymmetry in the free-trade treatments of both experiments.
Fisher’s exact test indeed rejects for the free-trade treatments the H0 that the good subjects
leave with is independent of their endowment (two-sided, p = 0.047 in Experiment 1 and
p = 0.001 in Experiment 2).7
In contrast, the forced-trade treatments in both experiments yield average trade rates
much closer to 50%. As expected, for the forced-trade treatments Fisher’s exact test cannot
reject the H0 that the good subjects leave with is independent of their endowment at any
conventional level of significance (p = 0.741, in Experiment 1 and p = 0.68 in Experiment
2, and similarly for a χ2-test p = 0.65, in Experiment 1 and p = 0.617 in Experiment 2).
The greater number of independent observations in Experiment 2 allow for more in-
depth analysis. Using these data only, we carried out two additional tests. We restrict this
analysis to Experiment 2, because we used different goods in Experiment 1, which was also
run in a different location. Pooling both experiments would thus require adding a number
of controls for only slightly more observations.
6Overall, we observed a general preference for chocolate in Experiment 2. This general preference is not
a problem, as the mean exchange rate controls for any bias in general preferences.
7For a χ2-test we get p = 0.024 in Experiment 1 and p = 0.001 in Experiment 2. A caveat regarding these
tests is that they treat the data as independent even though the participants interacted before we employed
our measure of exchange asymmetry. We note, however, that the last stage was conducted independently
for each participant and involved trade with the experimenter with a one-shot option, in contrast to open
haggling in a large group.
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Free Trade Forced Trade
Endowment Choc 0.2; 0.2; 0.25
−0.07;−0.07;−0.02
0.35; 0.22; 0.39
0.08;−0.05; 0.12
Endowment Mug 0.6; 0.44; 0.4; 0.56
0.01;−0.15;−0.19;−0.04
0.75; 0.69; 0.72
0.16; 0.1; 0.13
Table 3: Trade rates (top) and normalized trade rates (bottom) in the individual sessions in
Experiment 2. The normalized trade rate is calculated by subtracting the average trade rate for
the endowed good.
First, to compare the trade rates between treatments while taking any possible depen-
dence of the data within sessions into account, we ran Mann-Whitney tests comparing the
trade rates per session between the free-trade and forced-trade treatments. The trade rates
for the sessions endowed with mugs are generally higher (59.2% overall) than for those
endowed with chocolates (26.7%). Therefore, in order to be able to compare the impact
of free and forced trade using all sessions, while controlling for preferences regarding the
endowed goods, we normalize the trade rate in each session by subtracting the average trade
rate for this good (note that this is the average across all sessions endowed with the good,
both those in free trade and forced trade). See Table 3 for the trade rates and normalized
trade rates in the individual sessions of Experiment 2. The normalized trade rates are
significantly higher in forced trade than in free trade (z = −2.575, p = 0.01).
Second, we ran a probit regression with the dependent variable being whether the partic-
ipant leaves with the mug or not, and the explanatory variable being a dummy for whether
she was endowed with the mug, MugEndow (with robust standard errors clustered at the
session level), as shown in Table 4. We can see that the endowment matters in the free-
trade treatments (see column (1)) but not in the forced-trade treatment (see column (2)).
Moreover, if we run this regression pooled over both the free- and forced-trade treatments
of Experiment 2 and include a dummy for the forced-trade treatment Forced and an in-
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(1) (2) (3)
Free Trade Only Forced Trade Only Both Treatments
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
MugEndow
0.7835
(0.1233) < 0.001
−0.1257
(0.1309) 0.337
0.7835
(0.1188) < 0.001
Forced
0.3198
(0.1255) 0.011
MugEndow
XForced
−0.9092
(0.1720) < 0.001
Constant
−0.7835
(0.0501) < 0.001
−0.4637
(0.1220) < 0.001
−0.7835
(0.0483) < 0.001
Table 4: Probit regressions for the event that the participant leaves with the mug in Experiment 2.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) in parentheses.
teraction effect MugEndowXForced (see column (3)), we find a significant effect of both
MugEndow, representing the trade asymmetry in the free-trade treatment, and Forced,
indicating that participants endowed with the chocolate are more likely to leave with the
mug after forced trade than after free trade. This is consistent with forced-trade training
making the endowment less relevant. Most importantly, the interaction effect is highly
significant and negative with a slightly larger absolute value than that of the coefficient on
MugEndow. Under forced trade the trade asymmetry is not only significantly smaller than
under free trade, but it disappears completely.
To address the additional question whether exchange asymmetry is stronger for those
participants in the free-trade treatment who trade only little in the three rounds of market
trade, we split the sample according to the number of trades. The results are given in
Table 5. Most subjects either never trade or do so only once (60 or 58, respectively),
and only 10 trade twice and 8 trade three times. The average trade rates in the second
stage are almost identical for the subjects who do not trade in the first stage of the free-
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Experience Endowment Leaves with Chocolate Leaves with Mug Trade Rate
Chocolate 15 5 25%
0 trades in stage 1 Mug 17 23 42.5%
Average 33.8%
Chocolate 23 4 14.8%
1 trade in stage 1 Mug 17 14 54.8%
Average 34.8%
Chocolate 9 4 30.8%
2-3 trades in stage 1 Mug 4 1 80%
Average 55.4%
Table 5: The goods that the subjects leave with, conditional on their endowment goods in the
free-trade treatment in Experiment 2, separated by the number of trades made in the free-trade
training rounds (“Experience”). In the absence of exchange asymmetry the good the participants
leave with should be independent of their endowment.
trade treatment and those who did so only once. In both cases there is significant trade
asymmetry according to Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.027 and p = 0.022, respectively, and
p = 0.017 and p = 0.013 for a χ2 test)) and probit regressions (see Table 6, columns (1)
and (2), respectively).
For the subjects who traded two or three times in the training rounds of the free-trade
treatment, however, being endowed with the mug has no significant effect on the likelihood
of leaving with the mug, according to Fisher’s exact test (p = 1, and for a χ2 test p = 0.648)
and the probit regression (column (3) in Table 6). Moreover, in a pooled probit over all
subjects in the free-trade treatment, with a dummy for the subject trading at least twice,
and an interaction of this dummy with the mug-endowment dummy, the latter is negative
and significant at the 10% level (see column (4) in Table 6), showing that trade asymmetry
is significantly smaller (to the extent that it disappears) for the subjects who trade at least
twice in the training rounds. Since we have relatively few subjects who trade at least twice
14
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0 Trades 1 Trade 2-3 Trades All
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
MugEndow
0.8636
(0.2912) 0.003
0.9228
(0.2195) < 0.001
−0.3392
(0.6796) 0.618
0.9254
(0.1881) < 0.001
Minimum
2 Trades
0.3700
(0.5002) 0.459
Minimum
2 TradesX
MugEndow
−1.2646
(0.7345) 0.085
Constant
−0.6745
(0.2619) 0.010
−1.0444
(0.0719) < 0.001
−0.5024
(0.3449) 0.145
−0.8724
(0.1602) < 0.001
Table 6: Probit regressions for the event that the participant leaves with the mug in the free-trade
treatment of Experiment 2. Robust standard errors (clustered at the session level) in parentheses.
in the training rounds, and there is no difference between those who trade never or only once
(and those who traded three times in the training rounds actually traded less frequently in
the second stage than those who traded twice), the impact of the number of trades is not
entirely robust.8
More importantly, in contrast to our comparison between free and forced trade, when
we look at the effect of the number of trades carried out in the free-trade training rounds,
we cannot distinguish learning from selection. Some subjects may be more prone to trade,
and would thus trade more in both the first and second stages of the experiment.
8This can also be seen in a regression where we replace the dummy for having traded at least twice with
the number of actual trades carried out in the training stage. The coefficient on the relevant interaction
term just misses significance at the 10%-level.
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4 Discussion
We have shown that a simple design feature, “forced trade”, eliminates exchange asymmetry
in an environment where the same amount of market experience, “free trade”, yields sig-
nificant and substantial exchange asymmetry. Our results strengthen those of List (2003a,
2004), and further call into question the importance of anomalies such as exchange asym-
metry in settings where experienced agents populate the market. In particular, we find
that even very limited experience can be effective in eliminating exchange asymmetry. We
conjecture that this is so because subjects learn particularly if they are forced to make
trades that they would otherwise not carry out. In what follows, we address a number of
important questions regarding the causes of exchange asymmetry, what makes it disappear
and whether it is a real phenomenon or an artefact of biased experimental procedures,
considering the related literature.
Obviously, something changes because of forced trade. The model of reference-dependent
preferences of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) provides a useful framework to address the question
of what may have changed. Their model contains three key elements of individual behavior:
“consumption” utility – derived from consuming goods, “gain/loss” utility – derived from
the difference between a reference point and actual consumption, and expectations about
future consumption that determine this reference point. Each of these elements may be
affected by our forced-trade treatment and thus drive our results.
We can safely rule out the possibility that forced trade affects consumption utility in
a different way from free trade. The goods we used in our experiments are simple objects
that subjects encounter often in their daily life and that they had time to freely inspect in
both treatments. Furthermore, in the second stage of the experiment, the goods traded are
different from those in the first stage, and it would seem implausible that experience with
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the latter changes the consumption utility derived from the former. Note that what we call
choice uncertainty is exactly captured by uncertainty in consumption utility.
Hence, to explain our results in the Ko˝szegi-Rabin framework, some change must have
occurred in the gain/loss utility function or in expectations and thus the reference point.
One potential change in the gain/loss utility function would come from lower loss aversion,
as suggested by List (2003b, p. 23): “the main effect of endowment is not to enhance the
appeal of the good one owns, but rather the pain of giving it up (Loewenstein and Kahneman,
1991). Thus, via market interaction and numerous arbitrage opportunities, practiced agents
may have learned to overcome this ‘pain’ and treat the good leaving their endowment as an
opportunity cost rather than a loss.” According to this reading, subjects may shy away
from trade when they are particularly reluctant to give up a good. Our results would
then suggest that being forced to give up a good teaches subjects that their disutility from
losses is actually smaller than they had expected. The results would also suggest that one
voluntary trade does not lead subjects to learn sufficiently about their true loss aversion.
The third alternative within the Ko˝szegi-Rabin framework is then that forced trade
has shifted expectations about future trading and hence the reference point. The question
is then why these expectations are more receptive to forced than to free trade. In both
treatments, and in sharp contrast to most previous experiments, the subjects are fully
aware that the experiment in which they are taking part concerns trading (e.g. this was
written explicitly on the instruction sheets). Their expectations should then be shifted
towards trading in both treatments. Certainly, subjects who traded once or more in the
training rounds of the free-trade treatment should expect to be likely to trade also in the
second stage. However, the trade asymmetry is as strong for those who trade once as for
those who do not trade at all (see Table 5), and the difference between treatments remains
significant when we exclude the latter subjects. Expectations about the reference point thus
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do not appear to account for the observed difference between treatments. It may also seem
surprising that forced trade would shift the expectation exactly enough that we observe
trade close to its rational rate of 50%.9
The explanation we propose is also based on changes in expectations, but does not rely
on loss aversion. Assume that subjects form beliefs not only about their future reference
points, but also about the possibility that trading will lead to some costly mistakes, which is
what we called trade uncertainty. In this interpretation, subjects perceive trading as risky
and are thus willing to trade only if they have a strong enough preference for the alternative
good. Why then do subjects not appear to learn sufficiently about trade uncertainty when
they trade once in the free-trade treatment? Our conjecture is that in the cases where they
do trade (because they have strong preferences over the goods), they do not think much
about any risk (since their thoughts are focused on the much more attractive alternative
good) and hence learn little about trade risks. This is similar to the behavior often observed
in experiments where subjects have to price lotteries. When the stakes are high they tend
to focus on the gain, and forget about the risk. This type of behavior is a major cause of
observed preference reversal (see Seidl, 2002, for a survey).10 Forced trade, on the other
hand, allows traders to learn that trade is not as risky as they expected since they are
9A related issue is the possibility that our results are confounded by experimenter demand effects.
Subjects may perceive the forced-trade treatment as a signal that the experimenter would like them to
trade. This could bias the results in the opposite direction to any naturally-occurring exchange asymmetry,
without eliminating the forces that drive the latter. If this is the case, there is again no particular reason
for the exchange rate to be almost exactly 50%.
10Alternatively, individual subjects may not perceive the same degree of trade uncertainty in all trades.
Perceived trade uncertainty may depend on a number of factors and subjects may perceive relatively little
uncertainty in the market stage and greater uncertainty in the exchange with the experimenter, for example
because they feel more comfortable interacting with their peers. Trading in the face of little uncertainty
may well not provide any insight into trade under greater uncertainty.
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forced to make trades they would otherwise shy away from exactly because they focus on
this risk.11
Finally, we address the question of whether exchange asymmetry is a real phenomenon
or an artefact of experimental procedures, as Plott and Zeiler (2007) argue, based on their
demonstration that exchange asymmetry is sensitive to various experimental features. Their
results are broadly consistent with ours in that the variables they identify as crucial are those
closely related to trade uncertainty (such as the method of endowing subjects with a good),
whereas those addressing only aspects of choice uncertainty (such as public revelation of
choice) do not eliminate exchange asymmetry (although we note that these variables cannot
always be unambiguously assigned to one of our two categories). Nevertheless, our research
leaves open the possibility that exchange asymmetries occur outside the laboratory. Trade
uncertainty may well be perceived in markets. For example, this may explain (without
requiring loss aversion) phenomena such as the fact that people tend to stick with the default
for pension plans. As our results suggest, markets may not provide sufficient incentives to
explore new strategies that help to overcome exchange asymmetry, hence the asymmetry
persists. Forced trade may well be difficult to implement outside of the laboratory, but
exogenous shocks may produce comparable effects and hence enable us to study it in the
field. For instance, the subprime crisis forced an unusually large number of homeowners to
sell their houses. An intriguing question is whether this will have an effect on the future
willingness of the affected individuals to trade on the housing or other markets (the result
here could work in the direction of less trade, as the experience of having to trade may be
worse than expected and thus reinforce any reluctance to trade.)
11We can also interpret these different explanations from the perspective of Plott’s (1996) discovered-
preference hypothesis. The explanation based on consumption utility would be a direct application of
this hypothesis. List’s explanation would correspond to traders discovering their preferences regarding
losses rather than their preferences regarding the goods. Our explanation could be interpreted as subjects
discovering their preferences over trade itself.
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To summarize, our forced-trade treatment appears to remove any reluctance to trade,
and observed trading rates are, thus, as if subjects simply traded according to their pref-
erences between the goods, without the endowment mattering. Our experiments certainly
have not provided a definitive answer to the question of whether preferences or beliefs have
changed. As a more general contribution, our experiments also represent one step in the
crossing of the bridge between the laboratory and the field in both directions. It has been
suggested that market experience is a powerful tool to induce rationality. The laboratory
offers the kind of controls that are required to distinguish between different channels via
which markets promote rationality. In the other direction, the laboratory results suggest
experiments in which the effective learning devices in the laboratory can be implemented
in the field. For example, we could consider whether the forced trade experienced in the
laboratory spills over to trading behavior in the field, and for how long any such effects last
(i.e. have we “cured” our subjects for good?).
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